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Abstract 
Over-exploitation of fishery resources has become a major concern not only to users of the 
resource but society as a whole. Management of the resource has not yielded the desired result 
of sustainability despite huge efforts in this area. One reason for this deficiency is what 
Moxnes (1998) refers to as the misperceptions of resource dynamics which accounts for 
policy resistance in the fishery. Since the dynamics in the resource are not thoroughly 
understood, the policies arrived at end up not achieving the intended results and in some cases 
worsen the situation. Just like the management failure of Canada’s ground fish resources, well 
intended actions in Ghana’s fishery might have resulted in the problem of declining catches. 
In the 1970s fish traders stepped in to provide the financial needs of the fishers. Fishers paid 
back such loans by supplying the traders with fish. The paper investigates how this trade 
relation between fishermen and fish traders might have contributed to the problem of 
declining catches. Existing literature and simple models will be used to provide an insight into 
the dynamics of the resource and help to analyse how the two main causes of the catch decline, 
bottom trawling and trade relation might have impacted the resource. This will contribute to 
the education of fisheries managers and fishers about the resource which will help to manage 
the resource in a better way. The study adopts the system dynamics methodology of 
modelling to study the problem of declining catches and suggest policies to solve the problem. 
The findings are that bottom trawling by the industrial fleet should be halted to help provide 
safe breeding grounds for fish. Secondly mesh size regulations should be implemented in the 
artisanal fishery to make gears more selective. To make implementation of these policies 
effective, stakeholders should be involved in the management process.  
 
Keywords: fishery, misperception, dynamics, policy resistance, 
precautionary principle, co-management, stakeholders. 
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
The state of natural resources has been a major source of concern to researchers and the world 
as a whole. Water bodies, fisheries, forests among other natural resources have been 
supportive of mankind’s survival. The role played by these resources in the survival of 
humanity provides a good reason why they should be managed properly, so that they can meet 
the needs of current and future generations. The Amazon forest for example is a vast 
(5million m²) resource that has been beneficial to mankind’s sustenance (especially those 
living around it) for years (Kasperson J. X. , Kasperson R. E. et al. 1995). The extraction of 
forest products such as dyes, wood and herbs was the main use to which the forest was put in 
the 1900s. Rubber extraction later took over up to the 1960s when pasture development and 
pulp production became dominant. Mineral resource extraction began in the 1970s and in the 
80s and 90s timber extraction accelerated markedly. The resource is currently considered an 
area that calls for urgent attention (Kasperson et el 1995).  
 
Fish stocks is another resource that has drawn similar attention. An estimated 50% of fish 
stocks for example have been labelled as fully exploited and an additional 25% is considered 
over exploited. 7 out of the 10 most valuable marine species are considered fully exploited or 
over exploited with recovery rates of such species severely compromised (PROFISH 2006). 
The resource is moving gradually to a state of full exploitation with under exploited and 
moderately exploited stocks having been reported to be declining while the fully exploited 
and overexploited stocks are slightly increasing (FAO 2000).   
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Causes of resource over exploitation 
Human activities have been identified to be the driving forces behind these environmental 
changes. Loggers, cattle ranchers, dam builders, small farmers and plantation operators are all 
involved in the deforestation of the Amazon forest for example (Kasperson, Kasperson et al. 
1995). 
 
Technological advancement is another factor contributing to the overexploitation of resources. 
Improvement in technology has provided a general improvement in the human condition 
(Dalton, Coats et al. 2004). Such technological improvements have helped humanity to better 
exploit nature’s resources through the discovery of harvesting technology that have resulted in 
efficient harvesting of natural resources. Over the years there have been great improvements 
in the harvest technology in the fishery sector such as the introduction of motorized 
equipments and more efficient gears for example. This technological development has 
resulted in high harvesting rates leading to resources being exploited beyond their sustainable 
levels (Moxnes 1998). This has pushed resources into a situation referred to as ‘criticality’ - a 
condition reflecting a scope of impact sufficiently wide enough to merit global concern 
(Kasperson, Kasperson et al. 1995).  Recent investigations have revealed that such levels of 
exploitation cannot be maintained without depleting the resource. Unfortunately, managerial 
intervention in such situations usually comes a little late due to a misperception of resource 
dynamics (Moxnes 1998).  
 
The tragedy of the commons has also been long associated with the overexploitation of 
resources. This is  due to the existence of an open access regime which encourages the 
exploitation of a resource to be driven by the individual decisions of the users, usually 
motivated by the desire to make more profit (Hardin 1968). This situation arises because there 
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is no authority to regulate or restrict the rate of fishing thus each participant in the fishery 
maximizes utility by building higher effort. The fishery, unable to withstand the pressure 
collapses and becomes unprofitable.  
 
Another factor which accounts for this problem is the rise in global demand for fish and fish 
products and an attendant increase in prices (Seijo, Defeo et al. 1998). Rise in the world 
population has resulted in an increase in the demand for fish products. This is particularly so 
because fish is a relatively a cheaper source of protein compared to other sources.  
 
Management attempts at saving the resource such as minimum size limits, reduction in effort 
and catches have not been as successful as intended. Fisheries management or efforts at 
managing the resource has been in existence for long, yet stocks are still moving to the state 
of full exploitation (ibid).  
 
Misperception and policy resistance 
Moxnes (1998) identifies a reason that contributes to the inability of management to prevent 
overexploitation- the misperception of the bioeconomics and the dynamics of renewable 
natural resources. Fish stock estimates are already difficult to establish, but this is further 
complicated if the actual dynamics are misunderstood. Moxnes (1998) discovers that even 
with effective management regimes in operation, resources are still prone to be overexploited 
as shown in the reindeer experiment (Moxnes 1998). This situation suggests that beyond 
aggressive investment in harvesting effort lies the misunderstanding of how renewable 
resources undergo certain changes mainly due to human intervention through harvesting. 
Misperception of the bioeconomics leads to policy resistance; where policies are delayed, 
diluted, or defeated by the unforeseen reactions of other people or nature (Sterman 2000).  
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Causes of misperception in fisheries 
This situation arises as a result of the event-oriented view of the world, which creates the 
tendency to interpret experience as a series of events for example, inventory is high because 
sales fell, sales fell because competitors lowered their price etc. (Sterman 2000). This way of 
thinking links causes and effects and ignores the feedbacks.  
 
The event oriented way of thinking, Sterman (2000). 
 
In this demonstration there is a problem (gap between the goal and the situation). Decisions 
are then made to correct the problem. However since the focus is only on the problem, other 
agents in the system (which were ignored) cause the system to react to the solution and 
yesterday’s solution becomes today’s problem (Sterman 2000). Policy resistance arises 
because of a lack of understanding of the full range of feedbacks operating within the system. 
To make effective decisions (policies), it is important to understand that decisions do not only 
affect the results but as shown below, the environment is also affected.  
 
 
Sterman (2000) 
In a complex system, goals determine decision, decisions affect the environment and the 
environment also affects the decisions. Beyond this simple feedback loop lays an even bigger 
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loop representing how decisions and actions result in other results other than those originally 
intended. 
 
Sterman (2000) 
Actions generate effects; the intended effects are the main effects while the unintended and 
unanticipated, policy undercutting and harmful effects are what are normally referred to as the 
side effects (Sterman 2000). Side effects are not a feature of reality but a sign that our 
understanding of the system is narrow and flawed (Sterman 2000).  Such effects also have an 
impact on the environment and feeds back into the goals the next time round. 
 
There is an even bigger loop in operation impacting on the environment beyond our actions 
and their effects. This loop involves our actions and their effects and the actions of others. 
Since there are many players in the system, our actions and their effects are not the only ones 
that affect the environment but also the actions and effects of the other agents. Similar or 
different decisions made by the other agents makes the impact on the environment even 
bigger thus creating a more complex interaction between the agents and the environment. 
Below is a representation of such a feedback system which forms the feedback view 
recommended by Sterman (2000).  
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The feedback view (Sterman 2000) 
 
In a more complex system, many agents are engaged in constant interaction with the 
environment thus the environment is affected by and affects the decisions of all the agents. 
 
Cases of policy resistance 
A neglect or misperception of this feedback view leads to decisions or policies that are 
unlikely to achieve the desired results. An instance of misperception is demonstrated in the 
quotation below: 
 
‘In 1980, a Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
publication, in anticipation of the EEZ regime, stated that: ‘‘the opportunity 
exists, as never before, for the rational exploitation of marine fisheries. . . . 
The 1980s provide the threshold for a new era in the enjoyment of the 
ocean’s wealth in fisheries’’ (cited in United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization 1992). The hopes and expectations of the early 1980s have not 
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been realized. The same FAO recently reported that ‘‘69% of the world’s 
marine [fish] stocks . . . are either fully to heavily exploited, overexploited, 
depleted . . .and therefore are in need of urgent conservation and 
management measures’’ (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
1995). Coastal state fishery management programs have proved, in far too 
many instances, to be seriously deficient’ – Lauck (1998). 
 
The role that misperception plays in the overexploitation problem cannot be underestimated 
considering the fact that it is not only among resource users but present even at the high 
decision making bodies such as the FAO. The FAO’s hopes that the institution of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone was going to solve the problem of over fishing was not realized, 
instead it was realized few years later that the problem still persisted if not worse. The aim of 
instituting the EEZ was to promote conservation and management of the resource. But the 
well intended policies of the organisation were undercut by unforeseen factors. Another 
example of misperception is presented below. 
 
‘One of the most dramatic and depressing examples of fishery management 
failure under the EEZ regime is provided by the large and extremely 
productive groundfish resources on the famous Grand Banks of 
Newfoundland, which constituted Canada’s main bonanza under the EEZ 
regime. These resources had been overexploited while international common 
property. 
Under conservative Canadian management, it was hoped that fish stocks 
would be rebuilt, to the benefit of the Canadian fishing industry. The single 
most important of these resources, a cod stock complex extending from 
southern Labrador to southeastern Newfoundland, popularly known as 
Northern cod (Gadus morhua), was expected to yield sustainable annual 
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harvests of 4 _ 108 kg by the late 1980s (Canada 1983). These sustainable 
harvests were not achieved. In the late 1980s, the Canadian government 
introduced drastic cuts in the Northern cod total allowable catches (TACs). 
The drastic TAC cuts were not enough. In 1992, the Canadian authorities felt 
compelled to impose a temporary 2-yr harvest moratorium on Northern cod. 
The authorities were horrified to find that the resource continued to decline 
after the moratorium had been imposed. The harvest moratorium still 
remains in place (in 1996) and has ceased to be temporary. It is now 
indefinite. To compound the misery, the Canadian authorities have had to 
impose harvest moratoria on several neighboring groundfish stocks. The 
causes of the fishery resource collapse off Atlantic Canada are now the 
subject of an intense debate (Myers et al. 1997). What is clear is that the 
collapse came as a stunning shock to the authorities. One commentator 
remarked that the resource collapse would have had no credibility as a 
worst-case scenario, even a few years prior to the imposition of the 
moratorium (Roy 1996). What is equally clear is that the management of 
even seemingly stable fishery resources, such as groundfish, is subject to a 
far greater degree of uncertainty than heretofore had been realized and 
appreciated (Gordon and Munro 1996).’- Lauck (1998) 
 
This represents a classic scenario of the extent to which policy resistance exists in the fishing 
industry. Even under stable management and property regime, fish stock collapses are 
possible. In a complex system such as a fishery, policy resistance is an issue which should be 
minimized to a large extent to avoid such closures of the resource. In as much as this is the 
goal of fisheries managers, certain factors make this endeavour a rather complex agenda. One 
of such complexities is the conflicting interests of the stakeholders involved (Bailey and 
Jentoft 2002). A fishery is a political issue, since the government in power will like to gain 
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votes and following of fishermen. It is also a sector that generates political debates and 
politicians have an interest in the management of the resource. A fishery is also an 
employment issue because it is the source livelihood to those who depend on it. Being an 
employment issue also makes it a social issue because the resource and the users belong to a 
community and it is a source of food for this community. The list of stakeholders in fisheries 
therefore includes government, fishers, processors, environmentalists, communities to 
mention a few. All of them have different, sometimes conflicting interests. For example, 
environmentalists may be arguing for a reduction in catches while fishers and their 
communities may be demanding an increase. The government in power may also like to win 
the favour of the fisher folk so may yield to the demands of fishers even if data suggests a 
reduction. All these complex interplay of interests adds to the tendency to mismanage a 
fishery. 
 
Fisheries management differs from livestock or forestry management for instance. Livestock 
and trees can be seen and counted and any changes could easily be identified. Fish on the 
other hand is only seen when it is caught. Any changes in the stock could only be known 
through fishery research, monitoring and assessment, which are expensive and are done not 
monthly or even yearly, especially in developing countries. Decision making under such a 
condition is likely to take longer time and thus lag behind the events. Such decisions may not 
be accurate compared to that of the forestry manager who knows how many trees were 
destroyed by a storm or the livestock manager who knows how many animals died of a 
disease or were eaten by a predator. Fisheries is therefore engulfed in uncertainties that makes 
it difficult to make accurate decisions based on data (Lauck, Clarke  et al. 1998). This makes 
it even more useful to as much as possible identify as many feedbacks as possible.  
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The fisheries development cycle 
Aside the existence of uncertainties in a fishery, the resource also goes through changes thus 
policies under one stage may not be appropriate for the next stage. The difficulty here relates 
to knowing when one stage is ending and the next one beginning. The resource goes through 
six stages namely, pre-development, growth, full exploitation, overexploitation, collapse and 
recovery.  
 
 
                 A graph showing the various stages that a fishery goes through 
                                  Source: PROFISH (2009) 
 
At the pre developmental or underexploited stage also known as the exploration stage there 
are low catches, a limited market and basic technology (PROFISH 2009). As is characteristic 
of new discoveries and markets, awareness of the fishery is low thus there are few fishers. 
Few fishers means low effort levels and sophisticated gears are not abundant in the fishery. 
Marketing channels are also not yet well developed at this stage so there is no motivation to 
harvest much. 
 
The growth or development stage is made up of two sub stages, the initial growth and the full 
or exponential growth. At the initial growth, there are few pioneers, innovators and risk takers. 
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Over time the innovation and high profit attracts new entrants resulting in the exponential 
growth stage. The growth is powered by the discovery of new ideas, the use of more efficient 
harvest technology and the existence of a larger market. At this stage, institution and 
infrastructure are put in place to promote the exploitation of the resource but not the 
mechanisms to prevent an overshoot (PROFISH 2009). 
 
The full exploitation stage is a difficult stage to detect thus it is normally noticed when it is 
passed (PROFISH 2009). Full exploitation according to the Law of the Sea Convention means 
the extraction of the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) which after the institution of the 
United Nations agreement on fish stocks is not considered as a target but a limit (FAO 1995). 
This situation suggests that harvesting activities need to slow down when approaching the 
Maximum Sustainable Yield, however, the MSY is not a stable or constant figure. It depends 
on the current state of the fish stock of which current knowledge is generally inaccurate.  
 
The difficulty in identifying the full exploitation stage results in the resource reaching the 
overexploitation stage. This stage is defined as a situation where the catch rates exceed the 
MSY limit. This stage is also deceptive because catches could still be high due to fish 
behaviour or a delay in the stock response. Abundance begins to decline and the fishery 
becomes less profitable.  
 
The collapse stage is characterized by a huge decline in stocks and catches thus necessitating 
a reduction in the fishing effort. This leads to many fishers leaving the fishery voluntarily or 
on the orders of fishery authorities.  
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The recovery stage is when the decrease in the fishing effort makes room for the stocks to 
recover if the climatic conditions are conducive.    
 
Evidence of the misperception of the dynamics of the fishery can be noticed in the behaviour 
of the three graphs; catches, catch rates and effort. The catch curve keeps rising even up to the 
overexploitation stage. Effort also keeps rising accordingly, suggesting that the decision to 
increase effort is based on the catch levels. The catch curve suddenly collapses and the effort 
curve follows soon after. The drastic reduction in effort means job loss, a situation which 
could have been prevented if attention was paid to the catch rate curve. Right from the growth 
stage the catch rate curve (Catch Per Unit Effort) has been declining. This means that even 
though the catch curve has been rising, it was rising at a decreasing rate. This is an indication 
that the increase in the effort was not yielding the desired result. This situation clearly 
demonstrates what Moxnes (1998) described as corrective measures coming in too late. Such 
late intervention is due to the fact that attention was not paid to the more critical parameter, 
the catch rates (CPUE).  
 
The problem in Ghana’s fishery 
The fishermen in the artisanal sub-sector of Ghana’s fishery sector feel the effects of the 
decline in the catches in Ghana’s territorial waters. This is a sub-sector that employs many of 
the fishermen and accounts for an estimated 70% of the total landings in Ghana. Technology 
in this sub-sector is mainly a motorized canoe with a net and a crew of any number desired. 
As a result of less advanced technology, the fishing activity is done mainly close to the shore. 
Most of the complaints in newspapers and journals are from fishers in this sector who blame 
the decline of catches on the activities of the industrial fleets. The industrial sector consists of 
the steel hulled trawlers, tuna poles, shrimpers etc with refrigerators and processors onboard 
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and their operation is mainly in deep waters. They are blamed for bottom trawling which 
reportedly disturbs the breeding grounds of marine organisms. This is the main reason that has 
been reported for being responsible for the decline of catches. The artisanal sector is portrayed 
as the victim of the bad fishing practices of the industries fleets. This however, is not the only 
reason behind the problem. The fishery may be facing the unanticipated and unintended 
consequences of well intended actions in the fishery decades ago. 
 
In the 1950s Ghana’s fishery sector began to undergo a period of mechanization with the 
government being the initiator of such a process (Hernæs 1991) with the artisanal fishers 
being the beneficiaries of this initiative. The tedious paddling which prevented fishers from 
going deeper to as well as staying longer at sea was replaced by the outboard motor (Odotei 
1991). A major problem faced by both government and the fishers is the latter’s inability to 
afford the technology. After struggling to afford the motor, occasional maintenance which 
required the purchase of spare parts was also a problem (Hernæs 1991). To overcome this 
problem of financing, the government instituted a credit scheme on flexible terms to help the 
fishers afford the technology. Each motor cost 150 pounds and a fisher was required to pay 
25% and the remainder be paid over a year at an interest rate of 3% (ibid). Some fishers were 
not able to comply the terms of the arrangement. There were defaults and government had to 
revise the terms. In 1962, a new arrangement was made which required fishers to pay 20 
pounds and the remainder paid over two years (ibid). This arrangement could not solve the 
problem either. As a result, motorization as at the early 1970s was only 20-25% (Hernæs 
1991). The banks did not help either because of the requirement of collateral. The solution 
finally showed up to the relief of the fishers when women stepped in. Realizing that the 
success of their businesses depended on the availability of fish, established and successful fish 
traders (women) showed interest in the problem and began offering credit to the fishermen 
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(ibid). The terms of this arrangement was however different in the sense that unlike the 
government scheme, the payment under this arrangement was the supply of fish to the women. 
The fisher (borrower) must supply the trader (lender) with fish over a period agreed upon by 
the parties. The fishers benefitted from this by gaining the technology they needed and paying 
in ‘more flexible terms’. The trader also benefitted by having a reliable supply of fish.  
 
Not all the fish traders could afford to lend money to the fishers. Those with less solid 
financial abilities also adopted a method of securing their fish supply, they financed fishing 
trips. Fishermen embark on fishing trips that lasts for days or even weeks. Sometimes they 
crossed borders into other neighbouring countries such as Togo, Benin, Cote d’Voire (Odotei 
1991). Fishers faced problems because of low catches in normal seasons due to their lack of 
technology and the short glut season (July to September). The profits during this peak season 
were reduced because abundance brought prices down coupled with the increasing cost of fuel. 
Financing trips therefore became a problem thus fishers spent less time at sea and so brought 
home less catch. Women responded to this need and financed the trips in exchange for fish.  
 
There is a third category of women in the fishery, those who own canoes (Walker 2002). As at 
1992, women owned 25% of the canoes in the fishing community of Moree (Overå 1992). 
Ownership of the means of production such as a canoe is symbol of prestige and future 
security for the next generation (Odotei 1991:163, Overå 1992). The women got crew of men 
including their son’s to work with the canoe. 
 
There is yet another category of investors in the fishery, those who work in the formal sector 
but own canoes. They are known as absentee owners because they are not present at the shore.  
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The mechanization of the fishery sector in Ghana was made possible by the investment of 
women fish traders. Some commentators refer to them as exploitative while others classify 
them as entrepreneurial. Exploitative or entrepreneurial, one thing emerges – a constant 
supply of fish to offset the money lent to the fishers plus profits. Whether they lent money, 
financed trips or owned canoes, these women constantly expected fish delivery. Is it possible 
that this good and beneficial relationship between the fishers and traders put some pressure on 
the fish stock? How tolerant could a lender, financier or owner be of low catches? Will there 
not be pressure on the fishermen to make sure that their partners had fish all the time?  
 
 
 
The diagram demonstrates a possible scenario where a woman invests into the fishery by any 
of the three ways. Catches go up and she gets good supplies and she is happy so she invests 
more. This continues until the stock cannot take the pressure anymore and begins to decline. 
The catches reduce so the investor is not happy. Maybe she verbally puts pressure on 
fishermen to deliver more fish so the fishermen increase effort or she puts in more money to 
increase harvest. To avoid the withdrawal of her support, fishermen try harder to deliver more 
fish. This scenario can be represented as shown below. 
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The increase in effort may be by purchasing more equipment or by the use of nets with 
smaller mesh sizes which catches more fish by being less selective thus catching young fish. 
This further decreases the stock until it gets to a point where increase in efforts does not yield 
much and losses set in. Is it possible that the above scenarios may have arisen from the 
financial arrangement between the fishers and the women? 
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Objectives of study 
The objective of this study is  
1. To study the dynamics of the fishery 
2. To model the fishery system to identify the causes of catch decline 
3. Test how the financing by women may have impacted the stock 
4.  Recommend policies to manage the stock. 
 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this study is that the decline in catch levels in the Ghanaian marine fishery 
is a result of the lack of adequate understanding of the interaction between the resource base 
and the resource user group. The resource base has its own natural dynamics where as the 
resource user group also has its dynamics motivated by profits. These two groups on their 
own exhibit complexities but their interaction with each other creates an even bigger 
complexity which is counter intuitive. Inadequate understanding of this complexity has 
resulted in over capacity motivated by the aim of higher harvest and higher profit thereby 
causing the stock to decline to levels that cannot guarantee gainful employment and continued 
food supply. The growth in effort is not matched by the growth in fish stock but since fishers 
and possibly policy makers are not aware of the underlying structure of the system, they keep 
increasing effort in the hope that things will get better.  
 
Significance of the study 
Various attempts have been made to try to curtail the incidence of overexploitation. Among 
these measures are the institution of quotas and licensing systems in countries like Norway 
and New Zealand. These measures introduce restrictions onto the exploitation of the resource 
which resource users may not be happy with. As it stands however, there needs to be an 
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intervention: An intervention first through information and then restrictions. This study 
becomes important in this regard in two ways. Firstly a good understanding of the resource 
dynamics by the managers reduces the risk of driving a resource into ‘criticality’ before 
instituting management measures. Resource users may be increasing effort instead of 
decreasing it because of the misperception that higher effort may yield more. This leads to a 
situation where efforts at saving the resource come at a time when the resource is 
overexploited. This tendency will largely be reduced if managers of a resource gain a good 
understanding of the resource dynamics and put measures in place to put this situation under 
control. The second way that this study could be important is in the area of eliciting co-
operation from resource users. A lack of understanding of the dynamics of the resource by 
users is likely to result in them resisting the efforts by management to save the resource. 
Quotas and licenses may be considered by users as ways adopted by management to exclude 
users from benefiting from the resource. On the other hand, by understanding the dynamics, 
users will appreciate management effort and be more cooperative. Managing the resource will 
become more collaborative and will be based more on understanding rather than an 
imposition by an authority.  
 
Methodology 
This study will follow the system dynamics approach to studying a problem. First a reference 
mode will be derived to help define the problem dynamically. Due to lack of historical data 
the reference mode will be based on accounts gathered from news papers, journals, articles etc. 
Next there will be a dynamic hypothesis to try to provide an idea of what might be responsible 
for the behaviour observed in the reference mode. A model will then be created to try and 
replicate the structure of the system that generated the behaviour observed in the reference 
mode. The model will then be simulated to replicate the reference mode. Policies and 
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suggestions will then be inputted into the model to see what behaviour will be generated. 
Recommendations will then be made based on which policies are able to strengthen 
favourable loops and weaken unfavourable ones.   
 
Theoretical framework 
To be able to sustainably manage the resource, policies must be made to regulate the effort 
level in the fishery. The effectiveness of such policies will depend on the extent to which 
consensus is built within the user groups as well as with the management authorities. It also 
follows that stakeholder groups must be identified and together they agree on the most 
appropriate means of managing the resource. In this regard this thesis will employ the concept 
of precautionary approach to management which is a proactive and preventive approach to 
resource management. Secondly, the concept of stakeholders will be adopted to help identify 
which groups could be invited to the negotiation table. Thirdly, the representation of 
stakeholders means that decisions cannot be made unilaterally by government representatives 
but in conjunction with these stakeholders. Thus the concept of co-management and in 
broader sense interactive governance, which is the collaborative effort between government 
and other stakeholders to manage a resource, will be adopted. 
 
Problems of the study 
The main problem faced during the course of writing this thesis is the difficulty in getting 
recorded figures about the Ghanaian fishery. There are no records of the number of fishermen, 
fishing boats, stock size, and daily landing figures and so on. This made it difficult to get a 
reference mode that is based on data. The availability of data on these variables would have 
provided a better model behaviour than the use of imaginary figures as done in this case.   
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Chapter 2 
 
The dynamics of renewable natural resources. 
The difficulties encountered in fisheries management arise not only because of the different 
stakeholders involved, but also the dynamics within these stakeholders as well as their 
interaction with each other. A fishery can be decomposed into three subsystems that interact 
to give the resource its unique behaviour, making it a complex system. These are the resource 
subsystem, the resource- user subsystem and the management subsystem (Seijo, Defeo et al. 
1998). The resource subsystem refers to the resource base itself, the biological factors (such 
as recruitment, growth, death etc), and environmental factors that determine abundance and 
distribution and ecological interdependencies. The resource user subsystem represents the 
fishing effort, gear selectivity, sizes and ages of the fleets and the economic factors that 
motivate users’ intervention. The Management subsystem refers to the management regime 
and measures or strategies put in place to manage the resource. The three subsystems on their 
own are complex but when they interact, the complexities that arise from such interactions 
become even more difficult to comprehend. Such is the nature of the interaction between the 
economic and biological factors in a resources referred to as Bioeconomics. The three 
subsystems and their interactions (bioeconomics) can be demonstrated using the stock and 
flow structure to explain the dynamics of the system.   
 
The resource (biological) subsystem 
The dynamics in the resource subsystem involves the recruitment (birth) of new fish, 
migration of fish to other areas and death (through predation, starvation and 
competition). The diagram below represents the fishery as a stock with an inflow of 
recruitment determined by the size of the existing stock and the rate of increment of 
the stock. This represents the recruitment aspect of the dynamics. The encircled R 
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denotes that the bigger the stock size the higher the recruitment and vice versa. The 
variable labelled ‘stock growth rate’ is determined by the time taken by new fish to 
grow (time to maturity).   
 
fish stock
recruitment rate
stock growth rate
R
 
                                A stock and flow diagram show the growth of fish stock 
This structure alone produces a stock behaviour as demonstrated in the graph below. The 
existing stock of fish produces young ones which are recruited into the fishery to add to the 
existing stock and the stock size becomes bigger. This process continues thus making the 
stock to assume the exponential growth observed in the graph. 
 
A graph showing the exponential growth of a fish stock in tons.  
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The number of young fish recruited into the fishery follows a similar trend as the stock. The 
size of the recruitment is small in the beginning, but as the stock becomes bigger more young 
ones are produced.  
 
 
A graph showing how many tons of young fish are recruited into the fishery per year 
 
This process of growth does not continue forever. Due to factors that will be discussed later, 
some of the fish begin to die. Incorporating the death aspect of the dynamics generates the 
structure below. The death rate (a product of the stock and death fraction) decreases the fish 
stock. The death fraction represents a percentage of the stock that dies within the period under 
consideration. The death fraction is made up of all the causes of death other than human 
intervention including starvation, competition and predation. The larger the death fraction the 
larger will be the death rate and vice versa.  
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fish stock
recruitment rate
stock growth rate
R
death rate
death fraction
 
A stock and flow structure showing a stock of fish and its inflow of recruitment and outflow of death 
 
With the inclusion of death, the stock still grows in an exponential manner as shown in the 
graph but only up to 6000 tons in year 20 compared to 30000 tons when there was no death.  
 
A graph showing the growth in fish stock in ton when such growth is impeded by death 
 
The recruitment rate is also affected by the impact of death. The size of recruitment reduces 
from 6000 tons to 1000 tons.   
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A graph showing the number of fish in tons recruited into the fishery when there is death in the fishery per year 
 
The death in the fishery arises when the stock approaches the environment’s carrying capacity. 
Since space (in this case water body) and food are not inexhaustible, the growth of the stock is 
restricted to the resources available to support the stock. This constraint is referred to as the 
carrying capacity. The stock grows until it reaches the carrying capacity where food and space 
become fully utilized. Another variable, density (Stock/carrying capacity) refers to the 
concentration of fish (number of fishes sharing an area or food). The higher the stock levels 
given a finite carrying capacity the higher the density.  Higher density means that within a 
given area, there are so many fish to share the food and space. This results in competition for 
these resources which can result in starvation. This results in a higher death fraction and 
eventual high death rate due to competition and starvation if food is availability is low 
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B
  
A stock and flow diagram showing the impact of the carrying capacity of the environment on the death rate 
 
In this model the assumption is that the death fraction follows a pattern as represented in the 
table function below. When the density is 0.5 (50% of carrying capacity) death fraction is 
about 0.2 and at a density of 0.8 the death fraction is a bit over 0.4.  
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A table function showing the relationship between density and death fraction 
Inputting this table function into the model produces the structure below. 
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Stock and flow diagram modified to show the impact of the death fraction  
 
This structure can be represented in the form of a causal loop diagram as shown below. 
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The reinforcing loop R means that fish stock produces young fish and the stock experiences 
growth. The balancing loop B denotes that a higher stock results in a higher density which 
results in a higher death fraction. Death rate increases as a result thus reducing the stock size. 
The interaction between the R loop and the B loop keep producing the dynamics in the 
biological subsystem. The fish stock increases or decreases depending on which loop is 
stronger at a given time. When the R loop is stronger than the B loop, the stock will be high 
and vice versa. The behaviour of the stock is shown in the graph below. From the initial 
stages up to year 10 the graph exhibited an exponential growth which indicates that the 
reinforcing loop (R) was stronger. This means that during this period the stock was small and 
so density was low thus food and space was abundant. This provided room for the stock to 
grow until the stock approached the carrying capacity. Density became high and competition 
for food and space began to cause death. Balancing loop (B) became strong at this stage and 
the growth flattens. The curve assumes an S shape demonstrating a shift in dominance – a 
situation where one loop dominates at one stage and another takes over the dominance at 
another time (Sterman 2000).  
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A graph showing the impact of the carrying capacity to cause the stock to exhibit shifting dominance 
 
The same trend is observed in the recruitment curve. The recruitment was higher when the 
stock was growing up to year 10 until the balancing loop took over to reduce the growth.  
 
Graph showing the impact of the carrying capacity to cause the recruitment to exhibit shifting dominance 
 
The simple structure represented here reveals that the biological system left on its own 
undergoes changes from time to time. There may be seasons of lack of food thus increasing 
competition and starvation and driving up the death rate. There may be other periods of high 
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food supply thus death rate will be low. The dynamics become even more complex with the 
incorporation of environmental conditions and ecological factors. For example the abundance 
of a predator stock increases predation thus driving up the death fraction. On the other hand, 
an increase in the stock of a prey fish provides an abundance of food thus bringing down 
starvation. The stock therefore goes through cycles of highs and lows. 
 
The resource users’ subsystem  
The resource user subsystem comprises of the fishermen and their harvesting activities. These 
activities are motivated by not just the need to make profit, but also as a means of survival. 
Fishing activities, especially in developing countries is a job done mostly by the poor and the 
less educated thus earning the title ‘activity of last resort’ (Garaway 2005). This means that 
the people engaged in fishing activities are mostly people with no other alternative livelihoods. 
This description indicates that the exploitation fishery resources is not only motivated by 
profit motives but by also by the need for survival. This situation generates big dynamics in 
this subsector. The dynamics in the resource user subsystem is denoted by a stock of 
harvesting equipment (in this case fishing boats) and an inflow of new purchases and outflow 
of scrapping determined by the number of current boats divided by the average life of the 
equipment.  
 
fishing boat
purchase of new
equipment
scrapping rate
average lifetime
 
Stock and flow diagram showing a stock of harvesting equipment with its inflow of new purchases of equipment 
and an outflow of scrapping 
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The main determinant of dynamics in the resource user subsystem is profit. In the structure 
below, the equipment (fishing boat) is deployed in the fishery to harvest fish. Revenue is 
generated from the harvest which is used to meet the cost incurred in harvesting. Profitability 
encourages the acquisition of more equipment to increase the harvest. Loop R means that over 
a period the stock of fishing boats will be high if profitability keeps encouraging more 
purchases. Apart from profit, another incentive to keep effort high is the need to survive, 
which may even be stronger than the profit incentive.  
 
 
fishing boat
purchase of new
equipment
scrapping rate
average lifetime
harvest
revenue from
harvest
cost of harvesting
profit
price
R
 
 
A stock and flow structure representing the harvesting activities of fishermen 
 
Fishing boats are used to harvest fish, the fish is sold and revenue is realized. After meeting 
all the costs a profit may be realized which may encourage more investment in boats. If this 
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trend continues for some time there will be a growth in the fishing boats depending on how 
many boats are discarded or scrapped.  
 
A graph showing the growth in fishing boats  
 
The growth in the number of fishing boats yields profits as shown in the graph below 
assuming that fish is readily available.  
 
A graph showing the increase in profit. 
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Putting the two systems together results in the structure below. The resource user subsystem 
motivated by profit maximization keeps investing in equipment and getting more harvest thus 
increasing the death rate of the resource. Loop B becomes stronger and the fish stock begins 
to go down. This result in lower harvest levels and the profit begins to increase in a 
decreasing manner.  
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R
 
 
A stock and flow diagram representing the bioeconomics of the fishery. 
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A graph showing the behaviour of fish stock 
 
A graph showing the growth in fishing boats 
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 A graph showing profit in the fishery 
 
The Management subsystem 
The management subsystem is the authority responsible for restricting the operation of the 
resource user subsystem. This can be done by implementing policies to weaken the R loop in 
the user subsystem. 
 
Management regimes 
Fisheries can be subjected to four property regimes namely, state property, private property, 
common property and open access (Seijo, Defeo et al. 1998). The state property regime 
requires that access to and use of a resource is determined by a government institution that has 
the authority and responsibility to manage the resource.  
 
Under the private property regime, authority and responsibility is vested in the hands of the 
resource users. This does not totally alienate the state from the resource; users have the 
responsibility of refraining from destructive practices. 
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The common property regime refers to a situation where the authority over and responsibility 
for the resource is delegated to a defined group of resource users who make the rules with 
respect to the resource exploitation.  
 
Under the open access regime the resource is not considered as a property thus there are no 
rules governing the access and use of the resource. Any member of the society could benefit 
as much as possible from the resource. 
 
Fisheries management tools 
Fisheries management tools refer to the methods that are used to limit the exploitation of the 
resource. These tools include quotas, licenses, closed seasons, Marine Protected Areas 
(MPAs). Under the quota system, a specific quantity of fish is allocated to each fisher which 
cannot be exceeded over a certain period usually a year. A specific type of quota, the 
individual transferable quota (ITQ) is an entitlement of fish harvest which could be 
transferred to another fisher in the event that the rightful owner does not have the ability to 
utilize the opportunity. Such a right could also be traded, in which case it becomes an 
individual tradable quota.  
 
Licensing is a means of granting exploiting rights to people deemed qualified to use the 
resource. The licenses are given to users and are valid over a period. Only people with valid 
licenses can have access to and exploit the resource.  
 
Closed seasons are certain times within the year that a fishery is closed to users. The purpose 
of this measure is to allow the young fish to grow.  A marine protected area (MPA) is an area 
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where fishing activities are not allowed all together. This is done in order to conserve 
diversity in the ecosystem. 
 
Another management tool is gear restriction which prescribes which harvesting gears are 
allowed to operate in the fishery. An example is mesh size restriction which provides the 
mesh size of nets. This is aimed at making the gears selective to avoid catching immature fish. 
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Chapter 3 
A System Dynamic analysis of the Ghanaian fishery 
The state of fish stocks in the Ghanaian fishery is not different from the general trend of world 
fish stocks, especially considering the complaints from fishers and fish traders documented in 
the appendices. The lack of reliable data on the stocks and effort in the fishery makes it 
difficult to derive a reference mode based on historical data. However, reading about news 
items on the issue provides an idea about the nature of the reference mode. 
 
Reference Mode 
The reference mode is one of a declining nature as depicted by news items in the appendices 
but the shape and the slope is difficult to tell. Three types of potential reference mode curves 
could possibly serve the purpose but through scrutiny the most appropriate will be chosen.  
 
CPUE 
 
0                                                                                                Years 
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A reference mode of this nature does not represent the situation because the stock, the inflow 
and outflows are not constant values. For example a sock value of 10 with an inflow of 3 and 
an outflow of 5 will yield this reference mode. As the situation stands, the fish stock varies 
each year, the inflow of recruitment varies as well as the outflows of harvest, death etc. This 
reference mode can as a result be inadequate in representing the complexity of the problem. 
 
CPUE 
 
1970                                                                                        2005 
 
A possible shape of the reference mode 
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CPUE 
 
1970                                                                                          2005 
 
This is another possible shape of the reference mode. 
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Dynamic problem: 
Fish catch has been declining in Ghana’s fishery from 1970 to 2005 but has become more 
acute over the past 5 years. 
 
 
Dynamic hypothesis: 
 
fish stock
recruitment rate
stock growth rate
R
death rate
death fraction
carrying capacity
density
B
fishing boat
purchase of new
equipment
scrapping rate
average lifetime
harvest
revenue from
harvest
cost of harvesting
profit
price
R
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The structure above demonstrates the relationship between the harvest capacity and the fish 
stock that is responsible for the dynamics exhibited by the reference mode. The fish 
stock is increased by the recruitment as represented below 
 
fish stock
recruitment rate
stock growth rate
R
 
The bigger the stock the bigger the recruitment thus causing an increase in the stock size. The 
outflow of harvest causes the stock to decline. If the rate of harvest is not matched by 
the grow in stock through recruitment, the sock size will reduce eventually collapsing 
the stock if the trend is not halted. There are two stocks interacting in this system, the 
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fish stock and the stock of fishing capacity (boats). The reinforcing loops R in both 
stocks causes them to grow but evidently, the there is a stronger growth in the capacity 
side than the fish side. The balancing loop B between stock and harvest means that 
harvest reduces stock and the next time round, harvest will be smaller than previously. 
Harvest is a motivation for the purchase of more boats in order to get higher harvest. 
However higher harvest reduces stock size and the dream of a higher harvest is not 
realized. Fishers might be tempted to even invest more which makes a bad situation 
worse or keep the current level of effort which still exerts the same pressure on a 
decreasing stock.   
 
 
 
 
The model 
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Growth rate 
The growth rate is the rate at which the stock grows in a year. Smaller fishes such as anchovy 
have high growth rate because they spawn more often and in large quantities with a shorter 
time to maturity. Recruitment rate is therefore higher and the stock grows faster. Such stocks 
are better at withstanding high effort levels and take shorter time to recover from over 
exploitation. For instance the anchovy has a minimum population doubling time of 15 months 
and is labelled as resilient with low vulnerability (fishbase). Stocks of bigger fishes such tunas 
have lower growth rate because they spawn not many times in a year. For instance tuna 
(Thunnus albacares) has a minimum population doubling time of 1.4- 4years and is rated 
moderate on resilience and moderate to high on vulnerability. A stock such as this can be 
easily depleted and difficult to recover (fishbase). Sharks,  for example blackspot shark 
(Carcharhinus sealei) has a minimum population doubling time of 14 years and is labelled 
low on resilience and moderate on vulnerability. The growth rate is therefore an important 
variable in determining the effort level in the fishery.  
 
Catch per unit effort (CPUE) 
Catch per unit effort as the name denotes refers to the quantity of fish yielded by a unit of 
effort. It is calculated by dividing the catch over a period, usually a month by the effort 
(number of boats, people, and days at sea etc) used over that period. It is an important 
measure of the abundance of fish stock and it is common index used in stock assessment 
whether calculated from recreational or commercial fisheries (Haggarty and King R 2006). 
Catch and effort data from commercial fisheries can be an important source of the trends in 
stock biomass (Quirijns, Poos et al. 2007). There is however a deficiency in the use of CPUE 
thus making it a less authoritative method of stock assessment. Fish behaviour (such as 
schooling and gathering around light) and the efficiency of the gear could give misleading 
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CPUEs. For example catches may remain high even though abundance is low (hyperstability) 
due to high fishing efficiency or catchability (Haggarty and King R 2006). This situation 
could lead to mismanagement and miscommunication among stakeholders (Quirijns, Poos et 
al. 2007).  
 
Natural Death fraction 
Natural death fraction represents the percentage of the stock that dies through natural means 
such as starvation and predation. This is an important variable in the system because it varies 
from time to time depending on the availability of preys and predators. The availability of 
anchovy for instance contributes tuna abundance since the latter feeds on the former. In the 
same way, the abundance of sharks lowers the abundance of tuna. If effort is increased at a 
time when anchovy is abundant, the result may be different from when sharks are abundant.  
Catchability  
Catchability refers to the efficiency of the gear used in the fishery ((Haggarty and King R 
2006). It has a big effect on the CPUE and could be a major factor in the dynamics. An 
increase in catchability through the use of gears with smaller mesh sizes could result in the 
misleading situation of hyperstability mentioned earlier.  
 
Average life span of a boat 
Another important factor affecting the dynamics in the model is the length of time that a boat 
stays in the fishery. A longer life span such as 30 for example years means that aggressive 
purchasing of boats will result in a quick accumulation of boats (effort) which will be in 
operation for the next 30 years.  
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Causal Loop Diagram 
 
 
 
The fishery is characterized by the five loops- one reinforcing and four balancing loops. The 
reinforcing loop R1 is responsible for the growth of the stock. The stronger this loop the 
higher the stock of fish. The balancing loop B1 is the natural death loop. It represents the 
fraction of the stock that dies through natural means such as starvation, predation and so on. 
The higher the natural death rate the smaller the stock. Balancing loop B2 represents fishers’ 
behaviour. When stock is lower catch per unit effort (CPUE) is small. Fishers increase their 
catch efficiency (catchability) by using nets of smaller mesh size to increase harvest which 
further reduces the stock. Balancing loop B3 is the operating cost loop showing that profits 
encourage investment in more boats. Operating cost increases and profit reduces thus 
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investment reduces. The balancing loop B4 represents the bioeconomic loop showing that 
when profit increases investment in boats also increases. This result in a fall in the CPUE, 
fishers respond by improving catchability to increase the harvest but this reduces the stock.  
 
Analysis of the Ghanaian issues 
One of the concerns expressed in the Ghanaian fishery (Appendix 2) is the act of bottom 
trawling carried out by the industrial fleets. This method of fishing is reported to disturb the 
breeding grounds of fish thus it should be banned. It can be observed that this problem falls in 
loop R1. By disturbing the breeding grounds, recruitment rate is reduced and this reduces the 
stock size. Banning the act will provide a good environment for recruitment and thus and 
increase in stock size.  
 
The second issue is over capacity in the industrial fleets as well as their alleged operation in 
shallow waters. The overcapacity suggests overfishing which reduces the stock and the 
recruitment ability of the stock. Also, by fishing in shallow waters (meant for artisanal 
fishers), catches of artisanal fishers will be smaller which could make artisanal fishers to 
respond in the wrong way by manipulating the mesh size to catch more as shown in loop B2. 
Reducing the capacity in the industrial sector and restricting them to deeper waters is 
necessary to improve the stock. 
 
The third issue raised in the appendix is the operation of pirate fishers (illegal fishing). This 
contributes to reducing the catches to the artisanal fishers and this could be responsible for the 
operation of loop B2. The solution to this problem lies in monitoring and surveillance.  
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The fourth issue, the inability of fishermen to afford technology falls within loop B3. In the 
1950s profits in the fishery was low thus investment in the harvest technology (boats) was low. 
Operating cost was high thus the need for fish traders to assist in financing fishing trips and 
lending money to fishers in return for fish. The activities of women reduced the impact of 
loop B3 but resulted in strengthening loop B2. Harvesting increased beyond what the stock 
could withstand so CPUE has been falling and fishers keep manipulating their gears to make 
the nets less selective. Recruitment is reduced as a result and the problem keeps worsening. 
My guess is that the interdependent relationship between the fishers and the traders whereby 
the fishers paid back loans with fish supply resulted in a situation where traders would not 
accept excuses for lack of fish. Fish had to be caught even though stock was falling. This may 
have resulted in fishers reducing the mesh sizes of nets to catch more fish. This act however 
reduces the selectivity of the nets and young fish and non target species which may be food 
for the target species are caught. This results in increasing discards and by-catch thus reducing 
diversity in the ecosystem. These results in weakening loop R1 and strengthening B1 which 
eventually reduce the stock.  
 
 
Graph showing the rise in effort level due to financing offered by the women.  
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Graph showing development of the fish stock as effort level increases 
 
Graph showing the development of Catch per unit effort as effort increases 
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Graph showing the development of profit as effort increases. 
 
From the graphs, the five stages of fishery development can be observed. At the initial pre 
developmental stage when the fishers lacked finance, profit was low because they lacked the 
harvesting technology required to harvest the fish. When they got the loans from the traders 
they afforded the technology and effort began to increase and the fishery entered the 
developmental stage. More women financed more fishers and effort kept building the fishery 
entered the full exploitation stage. Stock began to decline and effort continued to build and 
harvesting rate, CPUE, profit continued to fall pushing the fishery into the over exploition 
stage. The next stage is collapse unless the effort is reduced and the stock is allowed to 
recover. 
  
Policies to revive the stock 
To slow down the decline of the stock loops R1, B2 and B4 should be targeted. Loop R1 
should be strengthened while B2 and B4 should be weakened. To strengthen R1, the activities 
of bottom trawling should be halted so as to reduce the disturbance to recruitment. B2 can be 
weakened by enforcing mesh size regulation. This measure ensures that only nets of a 
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prescribed mesh size are used. The use of unprescribed nets should attract a sanction. This 
will stop the incidence of mesh size manipulation which will reduce by-catches and discards 
thereby improving diversity and improving nutrition for the stock. The use of prescribed nets 
will also reduce the incidence of harvesting young fish thus improving recruitment. 
 
To weaken loop B4 efforts must be made to disable the link between profit and investment. 
The current situation of high profit motivating higher investment should be regulated. This 
can be done by issuing licenses to the current boats. This will ensure that even if profits are 
being made new boats will not be purchased unless the licensing authority deems it 
appropriate.    
 
One policy suggested in the appendix is aquaculture. This is a way to take some pressure off 
the marine capture fishery. This will weaken the B4 loop and help the stock to recover. The 
problem however is the capital to undertake this venture. One possibility is that non fishers 
with capital will go into aquaculture and not necessarily the tradition marine fishers switching 
to aquaculture. This will increase fish availability on the market but may not result in a 
reduction in the effort in the marine sector.  
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Chapter 4 
Recommendations for effective fisheries management 
Precautionary approach to fisheries management 
Fisheries management entails a lot of uncertainties and unknowabilities (Lauck, Clarke  et al. 
1998). There is uncertainty about the size of the fish stock, environmental conditions and so 
on. Fishery research is a major means of gaining updates about the fish stock but the cost of 
conducting the research is high, especially the developing countries. Even if such researches 
are conducted often, the limitations of science especially when studying complex systems 
such as the marine ecosystem make it necessary to allow a wide margin of error. It is in the 
face of these uncertainties that the precautionary approach to fisheries management becomes 
an important guiding principle. The precautionary approach is a guiding principle whose 
purpose is to encourage or oblige decision makers to consider the harmful effects of their 
decisions before pursuing them (Cameron and Abouchar 1991).  The precautionary principle 
recognizes that changes to fisheries systems are only slowly reversible, difficult to control, not 
well understood, and subject to changing environmental conditions and human values (FAO 
1996). This approach to management takes an anticipatory position and adopts a preventive 
and proactive measures to protect the environment by working with the assumption that 
mistakes can be made (O'riordan and Cameron 1994). The principle therefore states that 
‘substances or activities posing danger to the environment should be prevented from 
adversely affecting the environment, even if there is no conclusive scientific proof linking that 
substance or activity to environmental damage’ (Cameron and Abouchar 1991). The burden 
of proof and the standard of evaluating the proof lies on the entity demanding to take the 
action (O'riordan and Cameron 1994). Taking into account the uncertain nature of fisheries 
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management and the need to take action even in the face of incomplete knowledge, the FAO 
has outlined some guiding principles to serve as guidelines: 
- The needs of future generations will be considered and irreversible changes to the 
environment will be avoided. 
- Undesirable outcomes will be identified and preventive or corrective measures will be 
instituted promptly. 
- Such corrective measures should achieve the goal within a time frame not exceeding 
three decades. 
- Where the impact on the resource is uncertain, priority should be given to preserving 
the productive capacity of the resource. 
- Harvesting and processing capacity should commensurate with the estimated 
sustainable level of the resource. 
- All fishing activity must have prior authorization and must be subject to periodic 
review. 
- There must be a legal and institutional framework for fishery management, within 
which management plans that implement the above points are instituted for each 
fishery. 
The principle also outlines guidelines for managing the various stages of the fishery 
development.  
 
New or developing fishery 
- Always control access to the fishery, open access is not precautionary. 
- Immediately put a conservative cap on both fishing capacity and total fishing mortality. 
Attention must also be paid to excessive investment in the processing sector. The caps 
must be in place until there is substantial evidence to increase capacity and mortality. 
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- Build in flexibility to make it possible to take out vessels from the fleet. 
- Use area closures to limit risks to the resource and the environment. 
- Establish precautionary, biological limit reference points in the planning stage. 
- Encourage co-management and community management to ensure responsible 
conduct. 
- Establish data collection and reporting systems for the fishery. 
 
Over utilized fishery 
- Immediately limit access to the fishery and put a cap on fishing capacity and fish 
mortality rates. 
-  Establish a recovery plan to rebuild the stock over a specific period 
- Reduce mortality rates long enough for example closure of the fishery 
- Reduce excess fishing capacity from the fishery. 
- Alternatively, relocate vessels to underutilized areas. 
 
Fully utilized fishery 
- Ensure means of maintaining effort and mortality level at the current level 
- Pay attention to the warning signs (Age structure of spawners shifting to unusually 
high proportion of young fish, shrinking spartial distribution of the stock or species 
composition in a catches) 
- When precautionary limits are approached, ensure that they are not exceeded. 
- If limit reference points are exceeded, they must be restored immediately. 
- Avoid harvesting immature fish. Actions such as area closures must be taken if young 
fish forms a high percentage of catches. 
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Managing an artisanal fishery  
- Keep some areas closed to fishing and avoid the development of excessive fishing 
effort. 
- Delegate some decisions for example area closures and entry limitations to local 
communities and cooperatives 
- Ensure that fishing pressure from other segments (eg. Industrial) does not deplete the 
resource 
- Investigate the factors that may affect the behaviour of harvesters and develop 
approaches to reduce intensity.  
 
Theses are good guidelines to manage the fishery at any stage. The problem however is that 
again, there are misperceptions. For instance, under both fully utilized and over utilized 
fishery, the principle says, immediately limit access to the fishery. The misperception is that 
by limiting access, the current capacity will sustain the resource. This assumption ignores the 
natural dynamics of the resource and the fact that the resource on its own has periods of ups 
and downs. Natural death could be higher than usual due to a reduction in prey fish or the 
abundance of predator species. If this happens, the current effort level puts pressure on the 
stock and over fishing can occur. The principle also misunderstands that different fish species 
have different growth rates and resilience and vulnerability ratings. Low vulnerability stocks 
may be able to withstand the current effort level but not moderate or high vulnerability stocks. 
This guideline may work in an under fully utilized fishery but in an over utilized fishery, it is 
safer to reduce the current effort level. 
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Reducing the effort level requires education and involvement of the users. Users need to 
understand why effort should be reduced and how this will benefit them in the future. This 
requires the adoption of the co-management approach to fisheries management. 
 
Co- management 
There are debates over the world about the effectiveness of existing fisheries management 
regimes in achieving sustainability in view of the fact that many fisheries are in a state of 
overexploitation (Sen and Nielsen 1996). The government approach which is a top-down, 
bureaucratic approach has not only failed to yield the desired results but has exacerbated the 
problem through mismanagement (Jentoft, McCay et al. 1998). Concepts such as adaptive 
management, ecosystem manage, responsible fisheries are all results for the search for 
alternatives. All these models represent the growing recognition that for fisheries management 
to be effective, fishers must be involved in the process of regulatory decision making, 
implementation and enforcement (ibid). Two lines of argument support this approach; firstly, 
users possess knowledge through experience that may add to fishery science to produce more 
enlightened, effective and equitable remedies to the management challenge. Secondly, 
participation of the users enhances the legitimacy of the regulatory regime and compliance is 
achieved because users are more likely to be knowledgeable of, committed to and supportive 
of the regime (ibid). A common term used to describe this approach is co-management 
(Jentoft, McCay et al. 1998) defined as a partnership arrangement in which government 
agencies, the community of local resource users (fishers), non-government organisations and 
other stakeholders share the responsibility and authority for the management of the fishery 
(Pomeroy 1997). Co-management is thought to get rid of the distant, impersonal and 
insensitive bureaucratic approach that characterizes the role of government in fisheries 
management and be replaced with a system of interactive governance and co-operative 
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democracy which entails the participation of users at local, regional and national levels 
(Jentoft, McCay et al. 1998). Such a system of interactive governance is depicted in the 
diagram below from Carlsson and Berkes (2004). 
 
 
Source: (Carlsson and Berkes 2004) 
 
 
Through this system of interactive governance, co-management therefore moves from being 
merely formalized power sharing arrangement between government and resource users to a 
wider involvement of other agents in the society. In the diagram, the co-management process 
does not only involve collaboration between the government and resource users, but also local 
government, private sector and civil society. This makes the process more inclusive and this 
reflects in the decisions and also helps to build consensus.  
 
Although it is easy to witness the collaboration between the central government, local 
government and civil society  it is often the case that the private sector is left out (Yandle 
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2002). One reason for this may be the lack of the private sector’s direct involvement in the 
fishery but as demonstrated below, co-management operates best when seen as a triangle.  
 
 
Source: Yandle 2002 
 
In this diagram, the collaboration is only between the government and the community without 
inputs from the market. Decisions made in this arrangement will be less effective compared to 
decisions made with the involvement of the market (private sector). A proper representation 
of co-management is depicted as the interaction of the bureaucracy- based, market-base and 
community-based forces as shown below. Inputs from all the sectors are brought together and 
the decisions are better than if one is not involved.  
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Source: (Yandle 2002) 
 
 
This diagram shows the right form of co-management by bringing the different sectors of the 
economy together for decision making. This is more effective because the short falls in 
management by the individual sectors are compensated for by the strength of the others. For 
instance, Community Based Resource Management may have good ideas but lack the formal 
authority to enforce sanctions. Bureaucratic based resource management has the power to 
enforce rules but may incur more cost for enforcing such laws because of noncompliance by 
resource users. By coming together through co-management these strengths are combined and 
the result is better. 
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Levels of co-management 
The extent of participation has been classified into five types as instructive, consultative, 
cooperative, advisory and informative (Sen and Nielsen 1996). The diagram below 
demonstrates the different forms of co-management with the plain area representing 
government based management and the shaded portion representing user group management.  
 
 
 
Source: Sen and Nielson (1996) 
 
In instructive, there is minimal exchange of information between government and users. This 
type is only different from centralized governance in the sense that the mechanisms exist for 
dialogue but the process itself is one of government giving information to users on plans it has 
taken. In consultative, there are mechanisms to consult with users but decisions are made by 
the government. Under co-operative, both government and users relate as partners. Under 
advisory, users advise government on what to do. Under informative users make decisions but 
they inform government of the decisions. 
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Certain factors could determine the type of co-management to be adopted. One of these 
factors is the management task to be performed which includes policy formulation, resource 
estimation, access rights, harvesting regulations, market regulations, monitoring, control and 
enforcement (Sen and Nielsen 1996). For tasks such as policy formulation, full and equal 
participation of government and users is desired while others such as access rights could be 
decided by government in consultation with users (ibid). 
 
Another factor that affects which type of co-management to adopt is the stage in the 
management process namely, planning, implementation and evaluation (Sen and Nielsen 
1996). Full involvement at all stages could be costly but effective by increasing legitimacy 
and thus elicit compliance. A centralized planning could be cost effective but implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement could be ineffective (ibid). 
 
The extent of involvement of users also depends on the level of the decision, local, regional, 
national and supra-national (Sen and Nielsen 1996). It is easier to involve users at the lower 
level but the higher the level the less participatory it becomes (ibid). 
 
The extent of participation also depends on the representatives of the users, more articulate 
and informed representatives may demand more participation than less informed ones (ibid). 
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Stakeholder theory: From user-groups to stakeholders 
Although much emphasis has been placed on the involvement of user-groups in decision 
making, the concept of co-management entails more than the participation of user groups. It 
embraces other stakeholders in the industry (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001). This broadening of 
the co-management concept arises due to the many number of people with an interest in the 
industry. Stakeholders are thus defined as people who affect or are affected by the decisions 
of an entity (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001). Two key issues regarding stakeholders are the issues 
of identification and salience. Identification deals with determining who has a legitimate 
claim on the attention of the managers and thus deserves to be called a stakeholder while 
salience addresses the importance of such claims.  
 
Classification of stakeholders 
 The challenge in assessing claims of stakeholders is the limited span of attention of managers 
to attend to the concerns of all the interests in the fishery. This calls for a classification of 
stakeholders into primary and secondary stakeholders with the former having a direct impact 
on the survival of the entity and the latter lacking such ability.   
 
Criteria for classifying stakeholder 
To further simplify the process of stakeholder participation, stakeholders are classified based 
on their score on three attributes, legitimacy, power and urgency. Legitimacy measures a 
groups’ moral or legal claim on the entity, Power measures the groups’ ability to influence the 
entity’s decision and urgency determines whose claims demand urgent attention.  
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Types of stakeholders 
Using these attributes, stakeholders are then divided into three groups, namely, definitive 
stakeholders, expectant stakeholders and latent stakeholders. Definitive stakeholders are the 
groups that have all the attributes of legitimacy, power and urgency. They are the groups that 
have urgent moral or legal claims as well as the power to influence decisions. They are those 
groups that managers must attend to. Expectant stakeholders have two of the three attributes, 
such groups may have a moral claim but lack the power to influence or the claim may lack 
urgency. Latent stakeholders are the groups that have only one of the attributes and are thus 
considered the weakest among the three. Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) provides an example of 
stakeholders in the Norwegian fisheries based on these three classification. 
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Source Mikalsen and Jentoft (2001) 
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Conclusion 
Fisheries management is a complex exercise because of the uncertainties due to the lack of 
accurate data. The resource as has been described earlier supports a section of society that 
lacks other employment options. Mismanagement or even late measures may necessitate 
closure of the resource which results in unemployment, food crisis, and malnutrition and so 
on. A way to prevent this from happening is to take measures to limit fishing effort before 
stock collapses.  
 
Although measures such as quotas cannot be implemented in the Ghanaian fishery due to 
certain lapses such as lack of strong monitoring and control mechanisms, simpler measures 
such as licenses, Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), closed seasons, and mesh size regulations 
and so on can be enforced to protect the stock.  
 
This exercise should be done by the ministry of fisheries in collaboration with the fishermen 
and other stakeholders in the fishery. This will provide the platform to explain policies and 
the rationale behind such policies to the fishers in order to build consensus.   
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Appendix 1  
Model testing 
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1.  Equilibrium test (No harvesting) 
 
In equilibrium, where number of boats = 0, purchase =0, stock=10000 growth rate = 0.2, 
death fraction = 0.1, 
 
Expected result: Fish stock should grow and the other variables should be 0. 
 
 
 
A graph showing the growth of stock (in tons) when there is no harvesting 
 
 
 
 
A graph showing the growth in recruitment (ton/year) when there is no harvesting 
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A graph showing the absence of boats in the fishery 
 
A graph showing that there is no harvesting since there are no boats 
 
 
A growth showing that CPUE is zero since there is no havesting 
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A graph showing that there is no revenue in the fishery 
 
A graph showing that there is no profit in the fishery. 
 
 
The importance of this test is to show that without harvesting, the stock grows. 
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2. Behaviour reproduction test 
 
This test aims at verifying whether the model reproduces the behaviour observed in the real 
world. With initial values of 10 boats, boats bought per year=4, Average life=30, fish growth 
rate =0.2, Fish stock = 10000 tons, death rate = 0.1 
 
 
 
A graph showing the development of stock in tons when fishing boats are operating 
 
 
 
A graph showing the recruitment rate (ton/year) when there is harvesting 
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A graph showing the rise in effort(fishing boats) 
 
A graph showing the CPUE in the fishery 
 
 
A graph showing the harvesting rate (ton/year) in the fishery 
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A graph showing that revenue rises and falls in the fishery 
 
 
A graph showing the profit level in the fishery 
 
 
This test reveals that when 10 boats are introduced and 4 are bought each year, the stock 
declines over time and the other variable follow suit. At the initial stages, the boats are few so 
the stock grows up to year 25 where it begins to decline. Harvesting rate, CPUE, and the other 
variables decline but the effort keeps rising. This depicts the various stages of fishery 
development. For the stock to recover, effort must be reduced heavily.  
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3. Extreme conditions test 
This test aims at testing how the model reacts to extreme conditions. The flows are the main 
targets here and they are assigned very high values or zero values. In this model the flows are 
the investment rate, the scrapping rate, the recruitment rate, the death rate and the harvesting 
rate.  
 
Death rate: Assuming a death fraction of 1 (100%) meaning all the fish die. I expect the fish 
stock to be zero, recruitment zero, harvesting zero. 
 
Expected behaviour: Stock should decline along with all the other variables 
 
 
 
 
A graph showing that stock falls to zero when natural death fraction is 100% 
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A graph showing that recruitment falls to zero when natural death fraction is 100% 
  
 
 
 
A graph showing the development of fishing boats when natural death rate is 100% 
 
 
 A graph showing that when natural death rate is 100%, harvesting declines to zero 
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A graph showing that CPUE falls to zero when natural death rate is 100% 
 
 
A graph showing that with a natural death fraction of 100% revenue falls to zero. 
 
A graph showing that with a natural death fraction of 100% profit falls to zero 
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Recruitment rate at =0, I expect stock not to grow and thus the other variables will be zero as 
well. 
 
 
 
A graph showing that when recruitment is zero stock falls to zero 
 
A graph showing that recruitment is zero 
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A graph showing the rise in number of boats when recruitment is 0 
  
 
 
 
A graph showing that harvesting rate when there is no recruitment rate. 
 
 
 
 
A graph showing CPUE when recruitment is 0 
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 A graph showing revenue when recruitment is 0 
 
  
 
 
  
A graph showing profit when recruitment is zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86 
5. Sensitivity test 
This test aims at finding out how sensitive the model is to certain important variables. 
Assuming there is one boat in the fishery but 40 new boats are bought each year. 
 
A graph showing the response of the stock to high purchase of boats per year 
 
 
A graph showing high purchase of boats per year 
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A graph showing the response of harvesting rate to high purchase of boats per year 
 
 
A graph showing the response of CPUE to high purchase of boats per year 
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A graph showing the response of revenue to high purchase of boats per year 
 
 
A graph showing the response of profit to high purchase of boats per year 
 
This test reveals that the sudden increase in the purchase rate results in a quick rise in 
harvesting, revenue and profits but reduces the stock and recruitment rate very quickly as well.  
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5. Equations 
Investment rate (boat/year) = purchase_per_year*effect_of_profit 
Scrapping rate (boat/year)  = fishing_boats/avg_life 
Recruitment rate (ton/year)  = fish_stock*growth_rate 
Natural death rate (ton/year) = fish_stock*natural_death_fraction 
Harvesting rate (ton/year) = fishing_boats*catchability*fish stock 
Catch per unit effort (CPUE) (ton/boat) = (fish_stock/fishing_boats) 
Revenue (dollar) = harvesting*price_per_ton 
Operating cost(dollar) = fishing_boats*maintenace_cost_per_boat 
Profit (dollar) = revenue-operating_cost 
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Appendix 2 
News reports 
 
  
Ghana's fishermen battle with pirates 
 
 
Elmina relies on the fishing industry 
By Penny Dale in Elmina, Ghana  
Abeeku Osei leaves nothing to chance.  
Like other Fante fishermen in the bustling port of Elmina, 125km west of Ghana's capital 
Accra, he makes regular visits to the shrine to ask for good fortune and protection before 
setting out to sea in his dug-out canoe.  
Nowadays, 45-year-old Osei and his crew have to travel further 
afield in search of shoals of fish that were once plentiful closer to 
shore. But braving the Atlantic's unpredictable waters does not 
always result in bigger catches.  
Like other West African fishing communities, Ghana's small-scale 
fishermen find themselves having to compete with pirate ships and 
industrial trawlers for ever-dwindling stocks of fish.  
Already poor communities, with little viable alternatives, now find their livelihoods are 
increasingly threatened by these well-equipped, larger vessels.  
International competition  
Osei blames the foreign boats for dwindling catches of smaller and smaller fish: "Since 
the foreign boats arrived, we've really struggled.  
 
Since the foreign 
boats arrived, we've 
really struggled 
 
 
Abeeku Osei  
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There are no longer so many fish, and the ones you do catch are 
very small, too small really but we still sell and eat them. 
Otherwise we'd go hungry and have no money."  
He adds: "The days when we could go out in the boat at dawn knowing that we' d return 
by early afternoon with a boat full of fish are gone. Now we often come back empty-
handed."  
In Ghana, about 1.5 million people, including fishermen, fishmongers and processors, 
depend on the sea. Fish is a valuable source of animal protein, accounting for 60% of the 
country's intake.  
With the rapid depletion of stocks in European and Asian waters, trawlers from Italy, 
Spain, the Netherlands, former Soviet countries, Greece, China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
have moved into more fertile waters off West Africa.  
Some are there legally, others not.  
Stocks dwindling  
Over fishing and pirate fishing pose a significant threat to West African fish stocks, which 
now hang in the balance. The arrival in July of two high-tech surveillance boats will 
provide a much-needed boost to the  
Ghanaian navy's meagre arsenal in what has so far been a losing 
battle against illegal fishing.  
But fishermen and industry officials are also keen to see the 
government put an end to what they call a "glut" of trawlers 
operating in the country's waters.  
Some 93 foreign-owned industrial trawlers, which export tuna, 
squid, sea bream and snappers to Europe and the Far East, were 
licensed by the previous Jerry Rawlings administration to fish in 
Ghana's waters.  
Ghana's relatively high population growth, now about 3% per 
year, first put pressure on fish stocks. But industrial fishing over 
the past few years has escalated the problem of over-fishing, according to recent studies 
by the Rome-based Food and Agriculture Organisation and the International Committee 
for the Conservation of the Atlantic Tuna.  
"If the scientists say Ghana's fish stocks cannot support major trawling, the answer is to 
withdraw what is a glut of trawlers," says Samuel Manu, senior fisheries officer in Elmina.  
Government action  
The new government of President John Kufuor has promised to tackle the environmental 
damage to Ghana's fishing resources. But it is unlikely that it will 
go very far.  
The fishermen cannot 
compete with the industrial 
trawlers 
 
 
Samuel Manu: withdraw the 
trawlers 
 
The 93 vessels 
currently operating 
in the country are far 
more than the 
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Annual earnings from fish exports are close to $60m. The 
government has not, however, issued any new licences since 
coming to power in January.  
It is also in the process of inspecting all industrial vessels, which 
have been required to re-register, possibly with an eye to revoking 
some licences.  
The minister of state responsible for fisheries, Ishmael Ashietey, said: "The 93 vessels 
currently operating in the country are far more than the number required by law."  
The fishermen in Elmina welcome government moves to control the number of vessels, 
which they claim also fish illegally.  
Trawlers are not allowed to fish in waters shallower than 30 metres, but fishermen 
complain that they often operate in shallower waters closer to the shore, especially under 
the cover of darkness.  
In the meantime, until effective action is taken Abeeku Osei will continue praying for 
good fortune.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
number required 
by law 
 
 
Ghana's fisheries 
minister  
 93 
  
Ghana's local fishermen pay the price of overfishing  
afrol News / IRIN, 14 February - While their men were out fishing, the 
women of the Ghanaian village of Prampram used to carefully clean, 
smoke, preserve and then sell the fish. But now the men are coming home 
with less and less fish, and women say they can no longer make ends 
meet. Industrial fishing is blamed for dwindling fish stocks.  
"The fishing industry along the whole coast is collapsing," said Christina Sackey, secretary of 
the fishmongers association in Prampram, a fishing community about 45 minutes east of the 
capital, Accra. 
 
Ms Sackey said the shortfall has been especially acute in the last five years. She hopes her 
children will not go into fishing but she is also finding it hard to pay for their schooling.  
 
Fish is still one of Ghana's most important sources of protein, and a traditional mainstay of 
people's diets. But, despite 550 kilometres of coastline and an abundance of lakes and streams, 
more than 30 percent of the fish that Ghanaians eat is imported from other countries, 
according to government statistics. 
 
"I have been a fisherman my whole life," said Joshua Quaye, 29, as he drags his brightly 
painted wooden canoe up the beach in Prampram, after an unsuccessful day on the ocean. 
"How will I live? How will I raise my children? No one seems concerned about us."  
 
The Ghanaian Ministry of Fisheries estimates there are about 500,000 fishermen and 
fishmongers in Ghana, the vast majority of whom are struggling, like Ms Sackey and Mr 
Quaye, to make ends meet. The number of workers in the fish industry jumps to 2 million, or 
about 10 percent of Ghana's population when peripheral jobs are included, such as canoe 
building. 
 
Depletion of Ghana's fish stocks is not a new problem. In 1998, European researchers said 
that nearly 75 percent of Ghana's wild animals killed and sold since 1970 were related to the 
problem of dwindling fish stocks. 
 
David Eli, chairman of FoodSPAN, a network of 50 non-governmental organisations in 
Ghana working on food security, blames the dwindling fish stocks on industrial fishing which 
uses nets dragged along the sea bottom, a practice known as "bottom trawling". 
 
"Policies need to change in favour of artisanal fishermen because they cannot compete with 
large trawlers," Mr Eli said. 
 
Ghana's Ministry of Fisheries has tightened regulations on the number of licences it issues the 
types of nets that trawlers can use. 
 
But according to Ghana's national statistics, artisanal fishing accounts for about 75 percent of 
the country's whole national production caught for consumption, dwarfing the output of the 
industrial fleets. 
 
But also other solutions are sought. The Ministry of Fisheries is working to increase the 
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number of fish farming so that eventually they will account for 20 percent of local fish 
production. 
 
It is providing technical advice and workshops to entrepreneurs. Currently 1,040 fish farmers 
have registered 2,800 ponds in the country. "More and more people are expressing interest in 
the business," said Lionel Awity, head of aquaculture for the Ministry of Fisheries. 
 
"There is a huge local market that is not being satisfied," said David Sackey, 36, a fish farmer 
whose farm produced 1.6 tonnes of fish last year. "It is a lucrative business." But fish farming 
requires access to land and capital which are in short supply and even if the industry grows it 
is not going to help coastal fishing communities any time soon.  
 
